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Directed by: Dr. Richard L. Shull. Pp. 78. 
The effects of rate, patterning, and contingency of re­
inforcement upon ratings of perceived control and subsequent 
performance on anagrams were explored. Sixty college students 
learned a pretreatment task and received either contingent or 
noncontingent reinforcement. Under each of these conditions, 
either a high or low rate of reinforcement was given. The 
noncontingent conditions were further subdivided into yoked 
(increasing) and random (unchanging) patterns of reinforce­
ment. It was found that higher rates of reinforcement were 
perceived as more controllable than lower rates regardless 
of actual contingency. It was concluded that human judgements 
of control are not based on the controllability of outcomes 
by responding. None of the pretreatments affected subsequent 
anagram performance. Several possible reasons for the failure 
to find an effect on anagram performance were discussed. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and 
advice of Dr. Richard L. Shull, who served as committee chair­
man, and of Drs. Kendon Smith, P. Scott Lawrence, John Seta, 
and Charles Church who served as committee members. 
Of course, J. Vernon Odom's assistance as a second ex­
perimenter was invaluable in conducting the experiment. 
Gratitude is also expressed to Nancy Elliott for assistance 
in computer programming and to Dr. David Soderquist for 
consultation on data analysis. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES V 
LIST OF FIGURES vi 
CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION 1 
Learned Helplessness: The Essential Theory and 
Findings 4 
Learned Helplessness: Human Analogue Studies. - 11 
Perceived Control and Contingency 23 
Overview: Rate, Patterning, and Contingency 
of Reinforcement 33 
METHOD 39 
Overview 39 
Subjects 
Apparatus 41 
Materials 42 
Procedure 42 
RESULTS 4 7 
Independent Variables 47 
Analysis of Perceived Control Ratings .... 49 
Anagram Task 53 
Postexperimental Questionnaire 5 8 
Response Patterning in Pretreatment and Per­
ception of Control .61 
DISCUSSION 62 
Perception of Control Ratings 62 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 76 
iv 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Summary of ANOVA for Rate of Obtained 
Reinforcement over Blocks 4 8 
2. Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Group 
X Block Interaction on Rate of Reinforcement ... 50 
3. Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Rate 
X Block X Experimenter Interaction on Rate of 
Reinforcement 51 
4. Summary of ANOVA on Rated Degree of Control at 
each Block 54 
5. Summary of MANOVA for Latency and Number of Errors 
Measures of Anagram Performance 55 
6. Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Latency 
(in Sec.) Measure of Anagram Performance (Summed 
across Experimenters for Clarity of Presentation . 56 
7. Means (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) for Errors 
Measure of Anagram Performance (Summed across 
Experimenters for Clarity of Presentation) . , . . 57 
8. Summary of ANOVA on Trials to Criterion Measure 
of Anagram Performance 59 
9. Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Group 
X Experimenter Interaction on Trials to Criterion 
ANOVA 60 
v 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1. Instrumental Training Space 
(Adapted from Seligman, 1975) 5 
Figure 2. 2x2 Table from Jenkins and Ward (1965) .... 25 
Figure 3. Schematized Reinforcement Patterns Used with 
Pretreatment Task 36 
Figure 4. Summary of Experimental Design for Pretreat­
ment and Test Phases (Experimenters and 
Trial Block omitted for clarity of pre­
sentation) 40 
Figure 5. Rated Control as a Function of Trials 52 
vi 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The perception of causation of environmental events often 
has a notably immediate and convincing quality about it: a 
moving object strikes a stationary one, and the latter is 
quite readily seen as being "caused" to move by the former. 
In situations in which the causative agent of such mechanical 
actions is our own behavior, our perception of personal 
causation is again so immediate as to arouse little interest 
under normal circumstances: one's hand pushes an object and 
the object moves, with the amount of movement being commen­
surate with the amount of effort exerted. So compelling, in 
fact, is the perception of causation in such cases that 
Gestalt theorists often considered it to be innate. But 
what of situations in which the action is not a simple me­
chanical one, or when the correspondence between behavior and 
outcome is complex, rather than a strictly one-to-one cor­
respondence? Consider for example the perception of causation 
in the act of summoning an elevator by pressing a button. The 
elevator may arrive after a considerable delay, or it may 
arrive quickly. Complicating matters is the fact that the 
elevator may arrive even when the button has not been pressed. 
Yet, with repeated experience in such situations, most people 
develop the belief that they have some degree of control over 
the arrival of the elevator. Obviously, social learning 
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variables (e.g. instructions) have been excluded from the 
foregoing example, but it perhaps illustrates the fact 
that the perception of causality is indeed a complex affair. 
Furthermore, review of a number of current psychological 
journals reveals that the study of beliefs about personal 
control, and the effects of these beliefs on behavior, is 
receiving a considerable amount of attention from researchers 
and theorists. 
As it happens, however, it is possible to find quite 
divergent theoretical and empirical work concerning the 
nature and accuracy of human judgements of complex relation­
ships. On the one hand, Seligman's theory of "learned help­
lessness" (Seligman, 19 75) has at its core the tenet that 
animals and humans develop relatively veridical internal 
representations of the degree of relatedness obtaining be­
tween environmental stimuli, or between their own behavior 
and their outcomes. This theory also contends that, within 
limits, these perceptions transfer to situations beyond the 
ones in which they were formed. On the other hand, Jenkins 
and Ward (1965) and Smedslund (19 63) have found that human 
judgements of contingencies are far from accurate, with the 
inaccuracies following a consistent pattern. The present 
research examines the effect of rate, patterning, and con­
tingency of reinforcement upon judgements of reinforcemental 
control in human subjects, and the effects of these judgements 
upon performance in a subsequent task. 
3 
Seligman's theory of learned helplessness has received 
considerable attention of late, and it will be presented here 
in some detail. One possible reason for the interest focused 
on this theory is that the arguments surrounding it are 
reminiscent of the Tolman-Hull disagreements of some years 
ago. First, Seligman's theory is explicitly a cognitive one 
at a time when cognitive explanations of psychological 
phenomena are rising in prominence. In contrast, other 
theorists, perhaps best exemplified in a thorough review 
by Levis (1976), have mounted S-R interpretations of the 
helplessness phenomena. The issue of "what is learned?" 
(a cognitive representation of environmental contingencies 
versus specific behaviors) is very much alive in discussions 
of Seligman's work. Another issue, reminiscent of the 
"molecular-molar" question, is whether the effective control 
of behavior is best analyzed at a trial-by-.trial level 
(contiguity) or whether the animal in some way averages 
events over time (contingency). The present experiment is 
not an attempt to resolve such issues as whether an S-R or 
a cognitive interpretation has more utility. Theorists of 
either persuasion could probably construct convincing accounts 
of the results. The present experiment, rather, focuses on 
critical variables which influence what is learned. 
I shall begin by reviewing Seligman's theory and the 
experimental work with animals which has been offered as 
supportive of the theory, following that by a review, of attempts 
to replicate the learned helplessness effects using human 
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subjects. Then I will present the work of Jenkins and Ward 
(1965) and others who have explored judgements of contin­
gency made by human subjects. The latter studies antedate 
the original work in which Seligman begins to formulate the 
notion of helplessness, but their results suggest variables 
which could indeed be used in exploring the boundaries of 
the helplessness effect. After reviewing these studies, the 
rationale for the present experiment will be presented. 
Learned Helplessness; The Essential Theory and Findings 
A central concept in Seligman's theory is that of the 
instrumental conditioning space (Figure 1), which relates 
the probability of reinforcement to the presence or absence 
of responding. Along the abscissa, the probability of re­
inforcement, given that a response has occurred, varies from 
zero (extinction) to 1.0 (continuous reinforcement). Of 
course, situations also exist in which the presentation of 
reinforcers depends on the absence of responding, and these 
situations are represented along the ordinate. Points within 
the conditioning space reflect various combinations of re­
inforcement probabilities for responding and not responding. 
On a schedule described by point "b," for example, reinforce­
ment probability is .75 for responding and .25 in the absence 
of responding. Seligman's primary interest, however, is in 
situations described by points along the diagonal (e.g., point 
a). It is readily apparent that, at any point along' the 
Figure 1. Instrumental Training Space 
(Adapted from Seligman, 1975) 
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diagonal, the probabilities of reinforcement in the presence 
and in the absence of responding are identical. Reinforce­
ment is uncontrollable along this diagonal, in that neither 
responding nor refraining from responding alters reinforce­
ment probability. According to Seligman (1975), the organism 
forms internal representations (expectancies) reflecting 
the response-reinforcer relationships to which it is exposed. 
When exposed to an uncontrollable reinforcer (any point along 
the diagonal), the organism learns that its responses do not 
affect reinforcement probability. This expectation removes 
the incentive for active responding, and the animal becomes 
"helpless." 
Seligman (19 75) has summarized the experimental design 
and essential findings which have contributed to the develop­
ment of this theoretical approach. An essential element in 
learned helplessness experimentation is the use of the triadic 
design. One group of subjects receives some outcome con­
tingently upon responding, i.e., the outcome is controllable. 
A second group is yoked to the first, receiving the same 
number and pattern of outcomes, but independently of respond­
ing. A third group receives no pretreatment. All three 
groups are then given some test in which the outcomes 
are controllable. The yoked procedure is necessary to demon­
strate that it is uncontrollability of the outcome, rather 
than simple exposure to it per se, which accounts for any 
differences on test trials. 
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The actual helplessness pretreatment used by Seligman 
and his colleagues involved strapping mongrel dogs in a 
harness and exposing them to 64 unsignalled, inescapable 
6.0-m.A. shocks. Control animals received either no pre­
treatment or controllable shock. A day later, all dogs 
were tested on 10 trials of escape-avoidance learning in a 
standard 2-way shuttlebox. Helplessness was defined as the 
failure of the group receiving inescapable shock to learn 
the escape-avoidance task; their latencies for barrier-
jumping were significantly longer than those of the other 
"two groups, and they failed to escape at all on a greater 
number of trials. Further, it was reported that dogs in the 
inescapable shock condition often sat passively and accepted 
shock on the test trials (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman 
& Maier, 1967). These deficits in response initiation, accord­
ing to Seligman, demonstrated a motivational deficit. He also 
suggested that helplessness involved a cognitive deficit, in 
that helpless dogs who did occasionally jump the barrier and 
escape shock on one trial reverted to passivity on subsequent 
trials. With naive dogs, on the other hand, the occurrence of 
an escape response was a reliable predictor that further escapes 
would occur. On Seligman's analysis, prior learning that re­
sponding and shock termination are independent proactively in­
terfered with learning the new contingency between shock offset 
and jumping the barrier. Maier and Seligman (1976) also present 
an emotional deficit, defined as the physiological effect 
(ulcers, etc.) of exposure to uncontrollable aversive events. 
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A variety of experimental variations on the above pro­
cedure have been performed. Seligman and Maier (1967) 
"immunized" one group of dogs by giving them escapable shock 
in the shuttle box before exposure to the inescapable shock 
in the harness, and found that this procedure mitigated the 
effect of the inescapable shocks: immunized dogs learned 
the test task as rapidly as did naive dogs. Overmier (1968) 
demonstrated that inescapable preshock interfered with 
avoidance learning alone if escape was blocked. Overmier 
and Seligman (19 67) attempted to refute the argument that 
helplessness might be due to the adventitious reinforce­
ment of responses during pretreatment which were incompatible 
with escape-avoidance. They curarized dogs during pre­
treatment in an effort to prevent the development of overt 
patterns of responding, and they still found the interference 
with escape-avoidance learning which typifies learned help­
lessness. Also, Seligman, Maier, and Geer (1968) found that 
forcibly exposing helpless dogs to the prevailing contingency 
by dragging them across the barrier eventually alleviated 
helplessness. It was reasoned that the dogs' expectation 
that responding and shock termination were independent was 
gradually altered in this manner. Finally, Seligman, Maier, 
and Solomon (1971) and Seligman (1975) review studies which 
replicated the helplessness results with a variety of species, 
including cats, rats, fish, and man. 
At this point, it will be well to review several impor­
tant points regarding the above conceptualization of the 
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learning process and the portions of this conceptualization 
which are explicitly included in the statements defining 
helplessness per se. At several points, it is stated or 
implied that organisims simply learn about contingencies. 
That is, organisims are sensitive to points throughout the 
conditioning space (Figure 1). The clearest statements to 
date, however, of the helplessness phenomena are more re­
stricted. It is stated that "... the first step in the 
theory is that the organism acquires an expectation of re­
sponse-outcome independence, when outcomes are uncontrollable" 
(Maier and Seligman, 1976, p. 18). The interference with 
learning and performance, then, is produced because there 
is no expectation that responding will produce relief. 
Though the more general statement that organisms are re­
sponsive to points throughout the conditioning space is not 
included in these statements regarding helplessness, they 
are strongly implied, and are, I believe, appropriate for 
inclusion in discussions of Seligman's work. 
A second point needing emphasis is that the two steps 
in the theoretical statement, that organisms actively learn 
about uncontrollability and that this learning interferes 
with subsequent learning, can be seen as independent. It 
is possible, for example, for an organism to develop an 
expectation about contingency but, for various reasons, not 
to transfer that expectation to other situations. As Maier 
and Seligman (19 76) note, the factors influencing the develop­
ment of the expectation and the factors influencing transfer 
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need to be explored as boundary conditions of helplessness 
theory. 
Most learned helplessness studies with animals have em­
ployed uncontrollable aversive events. It is worth mention­
ing that a few studies have examined the effects of uncon­
trollable appetitive events, though they have not proven 
notably supportive of the learned helplessness theory. Engberg 
Hansen, Welker, and Thomas (1973) found slower acquisition of 
an autoshaped key-peck in pigeons exposed to prior noncontingent 
food compared to pecking in control subjects. In discussing the 
Engberg et al. findings, Gamzu, Williams, and Schwartz (1973), 
however, noted that the removal during the test phase of the 
treadle used by birds in the contingent food group also removed 
the stimulus for competing behaviors and, thus, rendered ques­
tionable the adequacy of this control group. Such competing 
behaviors could have slowed acquisition of key-pecking and 
thus eliminated the difference between the contingent and non-
contingent groups. Hulse (19 74:) found that prior noncontingent 
food retarded the acquisition of bar pressing in rats. He 
also found, however, that if the probability of noncontingent 
food gradually decreased during the pretreatment, the learned 
helplessness interference effect was not found. Much of the 
learned helplessness research has been done with human subjects, 
however, and it is to the human analogue studies that we now 
turn. These studies will illustrate the variety and complexity 
of research in the helplessness area. Particular emphasis will 
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be given to studies in which rate and patterning of reinforce­
ment may be illustrated as important variables. 
Learned Helplessness: Human Analogue Studies 
Maier and Seligman (1976) restrict their formal state­
ments to situations involving uncontrollable aversive events. 
Some human studies involve uncontrollable aversive noise or 
shock, and others employ insoluble problems as an analogue 
of appetitive (nonaversive) events. Certainly, it can be 
maintained that failure to receive an expected positive re-
inforcer is aversive, and that the above dichotomy is really 
one of degree. Seligman's frequent discussion of helplessness 
effects with nonaversive stimuli, and his own research in the 
area, however, should suffice as reasons for including such 
studies on an equal footing with those using aversive events. 
With human subjects, insoluble problems are often used 
to induce perceptions of helplessness. An insoluble problem 
can be described by a point at the origin of the instrumental 
conditioning space, as the probability of reinforcement is 
zero regardless of the nature of the subject's response. In 
an early study, Fosco and Geer (1971) gave four groups of 
subjects varying numbers of insoluble problems. Subjects 
attempted to guess the correct combination of button presses 
in order to avoid being shocked. On trials designated as 
insoluble, the subject was shocked regardless of the combina­
tion of his button presses. On soluble test problems, it was 
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found that errors increased significantly with increased prior 
experience with insoluble problems, a result which was in­
terpreted as consistent with the learned helplessness model. 
A noteworthy interpretative problem, also cited in a review 
by Wortman and Brehm (1975), is that subjects receiving more 
insoluble problems also received more shocks; we are unable 
to tell whether insolubility alone is sufficient to account 
for the results. 
Another early experiment in this area was reported by 
Thornton and Jacobs (1971). Some subjects could avoid shock 
on a choice reaction time task, while others received un­
avoidable shock as they worked on the task. All subjects were 
then tested on another task in which shock could be avoided by 
pressing the correct combination of buttons. The group which 
had received avoidable shock on the earlier task responded faster 
on the test task than those who had received uncontrollable 
shock. The authors noted that the group receiving uncon­
trollable shock performed as well as a group which received 
no shock during the first phase. The obtained differences, 
then, appear to represent a facilitation effect after receiving 
avoidable shock rather than interference after unavoidable 
shock. Furthermore, an interpretative problem arises in that, 
during instructions for the pretreatment, subjects in each con­
dition were informed as to whether their responding would affect 
the occurrence of shock. Thus, it is difficult to determine 
the extent to which the instructional set alone, independently 
of shock contingency, could account for the results. 
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Thornton and Jacobs (1972) used a similar version of the 
above pretreatment task, and then assessed the effect of these 
experiences on a subsequent test of intellectual performance. 
Instead of the expected interference in the group receiving 
uncontrollable shock, however, they found facilitation of 
intellectual performance. They were able to replicate this 
surprising result in a second experiment. No clear reason 
could be cited for this pattern of results, but it was suggested 
that the dissimilarity between the pretreatment and test tasks 
might have served to disrupt the generalization of helplessness. 
The realization that the second task was controllable, they 
suggested, might have increased the motivation to do well for 
subjects in the uncontrollable shock condition. It was also 
suggested that a Hullian drive concept might be invoked as an 
explanatory device, in that increased stress from uncontrol­
lable shock might have increased drive level and thus faci­
litated performance. At any rate, the results suggest some 
possible limitations on generalization of helplessness. 
An experiment which did find substantial transfer from a 
pretreatment using shock to a dissimilar test task was per­
formed by Glass and Singer (1972). Subjects in the No Perceived 
Avoidance condition were led to believe that they received 
shocks because of their failure to solve puzzles (actually 
insoluble). Subjects in the Perceived Avoidance condition 
believed that their successes on puzzles (actually soluble) 
allowed them to avoid shocks. Though subjects in both con­
ditions received a similar number of shocks, those in the No 
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Perceived Avoidance condition displayed interference on test 
tasks (proofreading and the Stroop Color Word Test). Post-
experimental ratings by subjects suggested that perceptions 
of helplessness mediated the transfer effects. 
Roth and Bootzin (1974) specifically addressed the issue 
of generalization of helplessness to a task which was explicit­
ly dissimilar to the pretreatment task. They used random 
(noncontingent) reinforcement on a concept learning task as the 
pretreatment, rather than the familiar electric shock. As was 
the case for Thornton and Jacobs (1972), a reversal of the pre­
dicted helplessness effect was found: subjects receiving prior 
noncontingent feedback showed more active attempts at control, 
on a subsequent task, than subjects who had experienced contin­
gent reinforcement or no pretreatment in the first phase. The 
authors suggest that a curvilinear relationship might exist be­
tween amount of exposure to noncontingent reinforcement and 
degree of active attempts at control: organisms may struggle 
harder to gain control when first exposed to noncontingent 
reinforcement, and with continued exposure, may eventually give 
up. Whether facilitation or helplessness is found would then 
depend on the amount of exposure to noncontingent reinforcement. 
Roth and Kubal (19 75) varied amount of exposure to noncontingent 
reinforcement as well as importance of the pretreatment task. 
For subjects working on an important task during the pretreatment, 
the curvilinear relationship was found: more exposure to non-
contingency increased the probability of helplessness and 
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decreased the probability of facilitation. Only facilitation 
effects were found for a task presented as unimportant to sub­
jects. Relevant to the present experiment is the fact that 
random reinforcement, rather than yoked, was used in the non-
contingent reinforcement condition. The potential importance 
of a random (unchanging) and yoked (increasing) pattern of 
noncontingent reinforcement will be discussed shortly. 
Thornton and Powell (1974) report a series of experiments 
employing variations on the design used by Thornton and Jacobs 
(1971; 1972). The importance of instructions regarding shock 
contingency was revealed in an experiment on alleviation of 
helplessness. Subjects who were informed that shock was con­
trollable in the test task did not show helplessness following 
noncontingent shock, though helplessness did emerge for sub­
jects receiving noncontingent shock without such 11 alleviation" 
treatment. These results suggest a limitation on the transfer 
of helplessness effects from pretreatment to test task; i.e., 
factors which increase the perceived controllability of the 
test task may reduce the probability of helplessness. 
Hiroto (19 74) applied the triadic design used in the earlier 
animal studies to noise-escape in humans. on a number of test 
measures, subjects who had received prior inescapable noise 
were inferior to those who had received escapable noise or no 
noise. Extending this procedure, Hiroto and Seligman (1975) 
performed a series of experiments designed to assess the gen­
eralization of helplessness. As these experiments are parti­
cularly illustrative of the question of rate and patterning of 
16 
noncontingent reinforcement, they will be discussed in the fol­
lowing paragraphs at some length. 
Two kinds of tasks, labelled as "Instrumental" (the noise-
escape task of Hiroto, 1974) or "Cognitive" (a discrimination 
task using "correct-incorrect" feedback), were employed in 
the pretreatment phase. For the Instrumental task, escape 
from aversive noise was either contingent or noncontingent 
(yoked to contingent). Additionally, a feedback light in­
formed subjects in the contingent condition whether noise off­
set occurred because of their response or because the noise had 
"timed out." Subjects in the noncontingent condition always 
received the light which indicated that noise offset was caused 
by the timer, not by their response. In the Cognitive pretreat-
ment, feedback was either contingent (veridical) or noncontingent 
(a prearranged, random schedule of "correct-incorrect" feedback). 
Three discrimination problems were used. In addition to the 
trial-by-trial feedback, subjects also tried to report the so­
lution of the problem at the completion of each one. Most of 
the subjects receiving contingent veridical feedback successfully 
reported the solution. Subjects in the noncontingent condition 
were always told that their solution was incorrect. 
The test tasks on which helplessness was later assessed 
were also labelled as "Instrumental" (a different noise-escape 
task) or "Cognitive" (a series of five-letter anagrams). Four ex 
periments were performed in all, pairing each of the two pre-
treatments with each of the two test tasks (Instrumental-
Instrumental, Instrumental Cognitive, Cognitive-Instrumental, 
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Cognitive-Cognitive). For all combinations except Cognitive-
Cognitive, the authors report helplessness effects (more errors 
and longer response latencies) following the noncontingent 
pretreatments. A subsequent experiment, adding a fourth prob­
lem to the Cognitive pretreatment, found the predicted inter­
ference on the anagram test task. The authors interpreted 
these findings as being indicative of a wide degree of generali­
zation of the helplessness effect, and suggested that such an 
expectancy of response-reinforcer independence could lie at the 
core of human depression. It is pointed out in the report, 
however, and deserves reiteration here, that subjects did per­
ceive all of the tasks as part of the same experiment. Such 
a perception of commonality could mediate generalization, even 
between tasks which are quite different in content. A more 
impressive demonstration of generalization would involve some 
unobtrusive measure of transfer, taken in a situation which is 
perceived as distinct and separate from the one in which the 
pretreatment was administered. 
With respect to generalization across tasks of different 
modalities, which was the essential focus of the Hiroto and 
Seligman (1975) study, it should be pointed out that the 
Instrumental-Cognitive distinction is a questionable one. 
All tasks involved the shaping of a response, whether verbal 
or manual, by the consequence of the response. It is not clear, 
in other words, why the tasks involving verbal responses were 
labelled as cognitive. The more relevant point for the 
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experiment to be reported here, however, is the manner in 
which noncontingent reinforcement was administered. Consider 
the question of rate of reinforcement, for example, in the 
Instrumental tasks. Recall that a feedback light was used 
to differentiate noise offset which occurred because of the 
"timing out" of the apparatus and that which occurred because 
the subject had responded correctly. Also recall that the 
noncontingent condition involved presenting the "incorrect" 
light (noise offset because of timer) after each response. 
Though the noncontingent condition was yoked to the con­
tingent condition for total exposure to noise, the noncon­
tingent condition received only the "incorrect" light. 
Granted, the procedure is consistent with an essential point 
in defining uncontrollability—that variations in re­
sponding for subjects in the noncontingent condition did not 
alter the probability of noise offset or the occurrence of 
the "incorrect" light. Such a procedure is actually defined 
by the origin or zero point of the instrumental training space 
(Figure 1), in that the probability of reinforcement is zero, 
regardless of the subject's responses. It is unclear, however, 
whether the perception of control (assessed in postexperimental 
ratings of helplessness) and the interference on the second task 
results from uncontrollability or from the zero rate of rein­
forcement. In other words, we are unable to predict whether 
differences would emerge between contingent and noncontingent 
reinforcement conditions if the rates of reinforcement were 
equal. 
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The above arguments relate to the question of how organ­
isms learn. If contingency is the critical variable, and 
people actually learn about contingency, then people receiving 
noncontingent reinforcement at a nonzero rate would detect 
the noncontingency. That is, differences in perceived control 
would occur between groups receiving contingent and noncon­
tingent reinforcement at an equal rate. The implication is 
that all points along the uncontrollability diagonal (Figure 
1) would be equivalent in producing helplessness effects. If, 
on the other hand, people learn the frequency of reinforcement, 
then contingent and noncontingent reinforcement would be seen 
as equally controllable, provided the rates of reinforcement 
were equal. Evidence will be presented shortly supporting the 
idea that it is frequency, not contingency, that subjects 
learn. The equivalency of points along the uncontrollability 
diagonal, then, deserves empirical investigation. 
A second feature of the Hiroto and Seligman (19 75) study 
was the practice of giving random feedback on three discrimina­
tion (Cognitive) problems, thus rendering the problems in­
soluble. Though the trial-by-trial random feedback included 
50% "correct," the subjects in the noncontingent condition, 
when they attempted to state the solution to the problem, were 
always told that they were incorrect. If the effective rein­
forcement is the feedback on each attempt to state the solution, 
then rate of reinforcement and noncontingency are again con­
founded. Hence, the foregoing argument about the Instrumental 
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task applies as well to the Cognitive task. A further feature 
of random reinforcement is that it is unchanging; the proba­
bility of reinforcement early in training is not appreciably 
different from the probability late in training. With con­
tingent reinforcement, on the other hand, reinforcement tends 
to increase in density as the task is learned. Thus, with 
yoked noncontingent reinforcement, the density or rate of 
reinforcement increases throughout the task, though the lack 
of contingency is constant. This point has potential impor­
tance for two reasons. One is that, though random and yoked 
procedures may be equated for overall reinforcement rate, it 
is entirely possible that subjects do not weigh recent and 
remote rate equally. Secondly, most trial-and-error tasks 
outside of experimental settings involve an increasing pattern 
of success (for example, learning to ride a bicycle). If 
generalization from such tasks to the experimental setting 
occurs, it could differentially influence the perception of 
increasing (yoked) and unchanging (random) reinforcement 
schemes; the yoked pattern could appear more controllable. 
Thus, the work of Hiroto (19 74) and Hiroto and Seligman 
(1975) supports the prediction that uncontrollability leads to 
helplessness in a limited sense. It has not, however, been 
convincingly demonstrated that uncontrollability, apart from 
rate of reinforcement, is the crucial factor. 
To date, only one study has explicitly compared yoked 
and random reinforcement schemes. Eisenberger, Park, and 
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Frank (1976) gave social approval to children either con­
tingently or noncontingently as the children worked a task. 
Noncontingent reinforcement was either random or yoked. On 
a subsequent task, it was found that the contingent approval 
group learned faster than the noncontingent groups, which 
did not differ from each other or from two no-pretreatment 
groups. The failure to find differences in performance be­
tween the noncontingent and no-pretreatment groups was in­
terpreted as possibly resulting from some inadequacy in the 
procedure used to induce helplessness. 
One experiment has been performed which explicitly 
varied rate of noncontingent reinforcement. Benson and Kennelly 
(1976) were interested in the fact that the Hiroto and Seligman 
(1976) method of using insoluble discrimination problems ne­
cessarily involves some aversive stimulation in the form of 
failure. Their argument, essentially, was that the amount of 
aversive stimulation from insoluble problems could be more 
important than the uncontrollability of reinforcement. Their 
design was similar to that of Hiroto and Seligman, with the 
addition of a group receiving 100% correct feedback both on 
individual trials and on attempts to state the solution to 
the problem. In this latter condition, they argued, rein­
forcement is uncontrollable, but the aversive stimulation 
arising from "incorrect" feedback is removed. Interference 
on anagram performance was found, as expected, in the standard 
insoluble condition. The 100%-correct group, however, did not 
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show interference. It was argued that the failure of non-
contingent positive feedback to produce helplessness under­
mines Seligman's theory. It is especially interesting that 
a postexperimental questionnaire on attributions suggested 
that the 100%-correct subjects and the standard insoluble-
condition subjects had perceived reinforcement as uncontrollable. 
The experiment described above is particularly interesting 
in that it is the only one to date to vary the rate of noncon- • 
tingent reinforcement. Though the authors focused on the aver-
siveness of the insoluble problem, rather than on the question 
of how people store information about contingency, their re­
sults clearly suggest that the effects of uncontrollability 
may be quite different depending on whether the rate of rein­
forcement is zero or 100%. Of course, their 100%-correct 
treatment involved an unchanging pattern of reinforcement. 
Thus, we are unable to tell whether it was the noncontingency 
or the unchanging pattern which is reflected in the similar 
ratings of uncontrollability in the standard insoluble and 
100%-correct groups. 
Taken as a whole, then, the experiments just reviewed with 
human subjects do not really provide conclusive support for 
helplessness theory. There is some evidence that perceived 
helplessness transfers to subsequent tasks. What has not been 
explored is whether the perception of helplessness develops 
from exposure to noncontingency or from receiving consistent 
failure. The equivalency of points along the uncontrollability 
diagonal (Figure 1) remains to be examined. 
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We now turn to the second general area of research men­
tioned at the outset of this paper, those studies exploring the 
perception of contingency. As these studies form a foundation 
for examining the importance of rate of reinforcement in per­
ceived control, they will be presented in some detail. 
Perceived Control and Contingency 
In contrast to the studies of learned helplessness, the 
following studies have not been performed with a common 
theoretical groundwork to lend them a sense of continuity. 
Granting the variability in experimental procedures, however, 
it is still possible to discern general trends which are rele­
vant to the learned helplessness literature, and which also 
have a bearing on the criticisms urged earlier in this paper. 
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) suggested that a concept of 
correlation in children becomes developed at about 14-15 years 
of age. They showed children an array of cards on which faces 
appeared, with each face having one of the four possible 
combinations of brown or blonde hair and brown or blue eyes. 
It was argued that a concept of contingency or correlation 
existed when the child based his statements about the rela­
tion between hair and eye color upon the difference between 
the total number of "confirming" cases (in this instance, 
Blonde hair/blue eyes and brown hair/brown eyes) and the 
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total number of "nonconfirming" cases (blonde hair/brown 
eyes and brown hair/blue eyes). Jenkins and Ward (19 65) 
argue, however, that these results are probably not parti­
cularly representative in that a small number of stimuli 
was used, they were all presented to the subject at the same 
time, and he could arrange them into groups as he liked. 
Another objection was to the definition of correlation used 
by Inhelder and Piaget. Consider the 2x2 matrix in Figure 
2 for example. There are more confirming (a and d) than 
nonconfirming (b and c) cases, yet,in Figure 2, there is 
no relationship between hair and eye color. The proba­
bility of blonde hair given blue eyes (8/10) is not different 
from the probability of blonde hair given brown eyes (4/5). 
Hence, Jenkins and Ward argue that the definition of cor­
relation used by Inhelder and Piaget applies only in the 
special case in which one of the two variables has both 
states occurring with equal frequency. 
Smedslund (1963) examined the understanding of correla­
tion in adults. In his first experiment, nursing students 
were shown one of five packs of cards, each of which contained 
letters representing symptoms and diagnoses. The subjects' 
task was to determine whether a relationship existed between 
two particular letters designating one symptom and one 
diagnosis. It was found that, over a range of objective 
relationships, the subjects tended to report correlations 
depending on the absolute number of mutual occurrences of 
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blonde hair brown hair 
blue eyes a = 8 b = 2 
brown eyes c = 4 d = 1 
Figure 2. 2x2 
and 
Table from Jenkins 
Ward (1965) 
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the symptom and diagnosis, and tended to overlook the number 
of times that one occurred without the other. Hence, sub­
jects often perceived a relationship where there was none. 
A second experiment, modified to simplify the task, sup­
ported these findings. In concluding, Smedslund states 
The apparent main finding of these experiments, then, 
is that normal adults with no training in statistics 
do not have a cognitive structure isomorphic with the 
concept of correlation. Their strategies and infer-
rences typically reveal a particularistic, non-
statistical approach, or an excessive dependence on 
the frequency of ++ instances. (Smedslund, 1963, 
p. 170) 
The above studies involved the judgement of a relation­
ship between events which were external to the subject. 
Jenkins and Ward (1965) examined ability of subjects to judge 
the relationship between their own behavior and their feed­
back on a task. If the 2x2 matrix in Figure 2 is transformed 
to represent two responses (R^ and R2) and two outcomes 
(0-^ and 02) / the index of contingency (AP) may be written 
| p(01/R1) - p(01/R2) I = 4 P 
That is, the extent to which 0^ is controlled by responding 
depends on the difference in the conditional probabilities. 
No difference (AP = 0) represents no control (the "helpless­
ness" diagonal). When A P = 1, the outcome is perfectly con­
trolled by responding. In an impressive series of experiments, 
subjects worked five problems presented according to a 5x6 
Latin Square design. On two of the problems, the outcome 
was contingent on the responses LP(01/R1) - P(01/R2) = .8 - .5 = 
A.P of .3 for problem X; .8 - .2 = AP of .6 for problem Y]. 
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Three of the problems were noncontingent (random feedback with 
varying proportions of reinforcement). The problems were 
worked on an apparatus containing two response keys (R^ and 
R2) and an outcome light. In one set of instructions, the 
subject was told to "score" as often as possible by pressing 
one of the keys on each trial, and the outcome light yielded 
either "score" or "no score" as feedback. In a second set of 
instructions ("control"), the subject tried to learn to con­
trol the appearance of two neutral geometric stimuli by his 
responses on the two keys. The latter condition was included 
to control for the possibility that the "score" condition, with 
an obviously preferred outcome, might produce biased judgements 
of control. If the score light appeared frequently, even if 
noncontingently, the subject might restrict his responses to 
the key which happened to precede the score and thus develop 
a spurious sense of control. The "control" instructions, with 
its neutral outcomes, were expected to lead to more equal re­
sponse sampling and more accurate judgements of control. The 
actual judgements of control were made after each problem on 
scales of 0-100 (no control - perfect control). It was pointed 
out in the instructions that zero control could be the correct 
answer for any of the problems. In addition to the above con­
ditions, some subjects were active and others were spectators. 
It was found that neither of the instructional conditions 
(score versus control) resulted in judgements of control which 
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were consistent with the actual £P index. The same effect 
occurred in the active and spectator conditions. In fact, 
for all conditions, the primary feature which predicted the 
judgement of control on a given problem was the number of 
times the score light had come on. Notably, the overall 
correlation between number of scores and ratings of control 
was .70. Analysis based on the response-outcome frequencies 
actually obtained by the subject revealed no real departure 
from the above results. 
In two further experiments, Jenkins and Ward varied the 
instructions, training, and nature of the questions used in 
assessing control. Across a variety of manipulations, ratings 
of control tended to follow number of successes ("scores"), 
and was unrelated to the objective degree of correlation. 
Only after extensive pretraining was it possible to disrupt 
the dependency of the judgements of control on number of 
successes, though the accuracy of the judgements remained 
poor. 
In short, the results of Jenkins and Ward (1965) sug­
gest, as did those of Smedslund (19 63), that adults do not 
have very well developed judgement of contingency. Subjects 
may perceive a high degree of correlation or contingency, 
even in the absence of a relationship, if the absolute 
number of successes or "confirming cases" is high. Such 
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results seem to question a basic assumption of learned help­
lessness, that subjects perceive noncontingency accurately 
(Maier and Seligman, 1976). 
Ward and Jenkins (19 65) examined the influence of the 
mode of presentation of the information in the judgement 
task. Subjects estimated the degree of control over rain­
fall exerted by cloud seeding. The data were presented to 
the subject in a set of problems, each varying the number 
of days seeding was present and absent, and the number of 
days rain was present and absent. Some subjects received 
the information serially, some in table form, and some re­
ceived the serial presentation followed by a tabular summary. 
It was found that the group receiving only the table, without 
the serial display, tended to follow judgement rules that 
were more logical than those used by the groups receiving 
serial presentation alone or both serial and summary. These 
results, they conclude, are consistent with the idea that 
adults do not make correlational judgements very accurately 
when the information is presented serially, as it usually 
is in most learning situations. Judgements only become more 
rationally sound when organization, such as a summary table, 
is imposed on the data. 
Thus far, then, the general pattern of results suggests 
that humans are rather unskilled at judging the degree of 
correlation between series of events external to themselves, 
or between their behavior and their outcomes. Some evidence 
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exists, however, which suggests that, at least in some situa­
tions, humans can in fact make relatively accurate judge­
ments of correlation. Beach and Scopp (19 66) gave subjects 
10 decks of cards, with each card containing two numbers from 
1-10. The decks represented correlations which ranged from 
-.85 to +.85. The subjects' task was to rate the degree of 
relationship between the numbers after looking through the 
deck. It was found that the proportion of subjects mak­
ing optimal inferences (according to a Bayesian approach) 
increased with the size of the correlation. Furthermore, the 
subjects' confidence ratings increased in a like manner. 
Citing the earlier evidence that humans have difficulty in 
judging contingencies, Erlick (1966) argues that humans 
typically learn correlations between events having more than 
two states of occurrence. Subjects watched two dials, each 
of which could assume each of five values. The values on 
the two dials varied across several series, such that the 
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correlations ranged from -1.0 to 1.0. Though there were 
discrepancies, the overall pattern was for the mean correla­
tional estimates to follow the objective correlation. Peter­
son and Beach (1967), in a brief review of these studies, 
suggest that the reliance on only one cell of the 2x2 matrix, 
as found in Smedslund (1963) and Jenkins and Ward (1965), may 
be limited to such simple cases. Humans become better 
"intuitive statisticians," they argue, in more complex cases. 
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More recently, Estes (1976) has presented data on 
probability learning which serve to illuminate some factors 
which are relevant to the present discussion. Subjects were 
shown data from "opinion polls" about political candidates, 
and were asked to make predictions about outcomes. The candi­
dates were represented by letters (A-^ vs. A£, vs. A^, 
etc.), and on each observation trial a tally appeared after 
the "winner." A variation involved a simulated poll about 
product preferences, but the procedure was essentially the 
same. Even with relatively small probability differences 
between alternatives (e.g., .46 vs. .54), the typical find­
ing was that subjects predicted correctly from 77% to 87% 
of the time. In most experiments of this type, however, both 
the frequency and the probability of winning for a given 
alternative are both useful for predicting the winner. Par­
ticularly interesting results are obtained, however, when an 
alternative's probability of winning is not consistent with 
its frequency of winning outcomes. If A and B are presented 
together, with A winning 75 times and B winning 25 times, A 
has a .75 probability as of being a winner. If C and D are 
presented 200 times, with each winning 100 times, each has a 
.50 probability of winning. When A and C are pitted against 
each other on a test trial, however, A has a higher proba­
bility of winning, though C has a higher overall frequency 
of wins. In such a case, it was found that subjects.select 
the alternative having the higher winning frequency, even if 
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its probability of winning is lower. It appears then, that 
subjects store information about the relative frequency of 
winning for an alternative, and rely less on probability in 
making their predictions. 
Estes explored the encoding processes in more detail, 
assessing the effects of specifically instructing subjects 
to attend to outcome classes. Some subjects pronounced the 
name of the winning alternative, some pronounced the name 
of the loser, and still others pronounced both. These at­
tention instructions clearly affected choice behavior, in 
that the variance accounted for by frequency of wins and 
losses depended on whether wins or losses, respectively, were 
pronounced during observation trials. Estes concludes that 
unless constrained by special instructions to 
attend to losing outcomes, subjects tend to 
ignore losses, store information in memory 
almost exclusively in terms of relative fre­
quency of winning outcomes, and make predic­
tions on the basis of this stored information. 
(Estes, (1976), p. 48-49) 
Generalization across such varying procedures is neces­
sarily quite tenous, but a brief summary may be helpful. It 
appears that, at least with a 2x2 contingency table, subjects 
do not judge correlations very accurately (Jenkins & Ward, 
1965; Smedslund, 1963). This holds for both judgements 
about correlations between external events and for correla­
tions between one's behavior and its outcome. Performance 
is improved by summary, rather than serial, presentation of 
the information (Ward & Jenkins, 1965). There is some 
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evidence that subjects rely heavily on "positive" data (e.g., 
joint occurrences of events to be judged, or successful out­
comes), and are less influenced by negative data (absence of 
one or both outcomes, losing outcomes). Furthermore, this 
reliance on positive outcomes can be disrupted by special 
training or instructions (Estes, 1976; Jenkins & Ward, 1965). 
Finally, judgements of correlation may be more accurate in 
situations which are more complex than those represented by 
a 2x2 table (Beach & Scopp, 1966; Erlick, 1966). Even as­
suming an appropriate degree of caution, however, it is 
possible to discern implications which the contingency judge­
ment studies may have for the study of learned helplessness. 
Overview: Rate, Patterning, and Contingency of Reinforcement 
Having just reviewed evidence that the frequency of success, 
independently of success probability, influenced the judgement 
of control and predictions of human subjects, I will now dis­
cuss the implications of these data for learned helplessness 
theory. Clearly, there are discrepancies between Seligman's 
position that people learn about contingencies and the evi­
dence just presented that judgements of control depend on 
frequency of reinforcement ("success"). How do we account 
for these discrepancies? 
Referring to the instrumental training space of Figure 1, 
we recall that Seligman has argued that organisms are sensitive 
to points throughout the space, not just the abscissa and 
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ordinate which have tended to attract the attention of re­
searchers. There is little discussion of the possible mecha­
nism by which organisms store and "compute" the relationships 
between behavior and outcome, but it is clear that contingen­
cy, rather than contiguity, is seen as the controlling variable. 
Seligman's studies have demonstrated that people exposed to 
noncontingent reinforcement showed interference on subsequent 
tasks, presumably because they generalized their expectation 
of response-outcome independence from pretreatment to test 
task. The data presented by Jenkins and Ward (19 65), however, 
suggest that perceived control would increase as the frequency 
of noncontingent reinforcement increased, i.e., moving along 
the uncontrollability diagonal from lower left to upper right, 
we should expect perceived control to increase. 
I have already stated that Seligman's procedure for ex­
posing subjects to noncontingency is essentially a complete 
failure procedure, and that failure is represented by a point 
at the origin of the training space. On this analysis, the 
results presented by Seligman are consistent with those of 
Jenkins and Ward (1965), in that a zero rate of reinforcement 
resulted in little perceived control.. The interpretative 
problem is that Seligman predicts these results based on the 
absence of contingency, whereas Jenkins and Ward would predict 
the results based on the absence of reinforcement. What is 
needed, then, is an empirical study in which predictions based 
on contingency and those based on frequency would differ. A 
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helplessness study using rates of noncontingent reinforcement 
at intermediate points along the uncontrollability diagonal 
would meet such a need. If helplessness results from non-
contingency, then a high rate of noncontingent reinforcement 
would lead to perceived noncontingency and interference on 
the anagram task relative to a group receiving an equally high 
rate of contingent reinforcement. If helplessness results 
from a low frequency of reinforcement, the group receiving a 
high rate of noncontingent reinforcement should not differ 
from the contingent reinforcement group. 
I have already outlined the potential importance of re­
inforcement patterning over time. There is also a need, then, 
for evaluations of yoked (increasing) and random (unchanging) 
patterns of reinforcement. 
In the present experiment, human subjects learned a pre-
treatment task under either a high or a low rate of reinforce­
ment. Within each reinforcement level, some subjects received 
reinforcement contingently upon responding, while others 
received noncontingent reinforcement. Figure 3 represents the 
reinforcement patterns used in the experiment. Subjects learn­
ing the task with a high rate of contingent reinforcement 
generated a learning curve and pattern of reinforcement simi­
lar to that depicted by line A. Contingent reinforcement at 
the low rate generated a pattern similar to line C. Subjects 
receiving yoked reinforcement also received patterns A and C 
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Probability 
of 
Reinforcement 
Trials 
Figure 3. Schematized Reinforcement 
Patterns Used with Pretreat-
ment Task 
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(high and low rate), but these reinforcement patterns were 
independent of responding. If subjects are, in fact, sensi­
tive to the contingency between responding and outcome, the 
rate of noncontingent reinforcement should not influence per­
ception of control. That is, if points along the uncontrol-
lability diagonal in Figure 1 produce equivalent perception 
of control, then both yoked conditions (A and C) should yield 
equivalent perceptions of control. If, on the other hand, 
rate of reinforcement affects perception of control inde­
pendently of actual contingency, then the yoked condition re­
ceiving pattern A should perceive more control than the yoked 
condition receiving pattern C. Similar reasoning holds for 
the random noncontingent reinforcement patterns depicted by 
B (high rate) and D (low rate). If subjects judge control 
based on actual noncontingency, B and D should yield equiva­
lent perception of control. Again, more perceived control in 
B than in D would suggest that rate of reinforcement influences 
perception of control independently of actual control. Finally, 
inclusion of both yoked and random noncontingent conditions 
allows evaluation of the effects of patterning of reinforce­
ment. In the yoked condition, reinforcement increases through­
out the task, while random reinforcement is unchanging. A 
tendency for subjects to weigh recent rate more heavily than 
remote rate could produce more perceived control in the yoked 
treatment than in the random one. 
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Maier and Seligman (1976) have argued cogently for re­
search which defines the boundary conditions of the helpless­
ness effect. The present study can be seen as exploring rate 
of reinforcement and patterning as boundary conditions. 
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METHOD 
Overview 
Essentially, the experiment involved two levels of re­
inforcement (High and Low), and three levels of controllability/ 
patterning. The latter dimension may be conceptualized as 
"similarity to controllability." Thus, maximal similarity 
exists, of course, in the groups receiving contingent rein­
forcement. The yoked groups received a patterning of rein­
forcement which was comparable to the contingent condition, 
but which differed in actual controllability. Finally, the 
groups receiving random reinforcement differed from the con­
tingent groups in both patterning of reinforcement and control­
lability. Hence, the pretreatment formed a 2x3 factorial 
design. Addition of a no-pretreatment control in the test 
phase would have resulted in an awkward 2x3+1 design. To 
facilitate analysis, each reinforcement level had its own 
no-pretreatment control group. Hence, a 2x4 factorial de­
sign was used for the test phase. This method of artifi­
cially crossing the experimental and control conditions, when 
the control would not otherwise fit the design, was suggested 
by Himmelfarb (1975). Figure 4 summarizes the design for the 
pretreatment and test phases. Two male experimenters were 
used, with each running half of the subjects in each'condition. 
Pretreatment 
Contingent Yoked Random 
High Rate 
Low Rate ' 
Test Task 
Contingent Yoked Random Control 
High Rate 
Low Rate 
Figure 4. Summary of Experimental Design for 
Pretreatment and Test Phases 
(Experimenters and Trial Block omitted 
for clarity of presentation) 
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Subjects 
A total of 84 students, participating for partial credit 
in introductory psychology, served as subjects. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to conditions, with the restriction 
that each group have 10 subjects. Apparatus failure or 
experimenter error resulted in the dropping of 4 subjects 
from the pretreatment phase, leaving an N of 60 for pre-
treatment. In the test phase, 20 subjects served as no-
pretreatment controls, resulting in an N of 80. A total of 
19 males and 61 females participated. The groups are desig­
nated as follows: High Contingent, Low Contingent, High 
Yoked, Low Yoked, High Random, Low Random, and No-Pretreatment. 
Apparatus 
Standard electromechanical equipment was used. In pre­
treatment, the subject's panel was mounted on a plywood stand 
and stood on a table in front of the subject. The control 
rack and an event recorder were situated behind a screen ap­
proximately 2 meters from the subject. The control rack was 
encased in sound-attenuating material. 
The subjects' panel consisted of three lights spaced 7.7 
cm. apart horizontally and a response button 9 cm. below the 
third light. The first light was white and had the word 
"Ready" printed under it. The middle light (green) was labelled 
"Start"; and the third (red), "Score." 
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Materials 
Ratings of perceived control during the pretreatment 
phase were made on individual sheets of paper contained in 
a binder. On each sheet was a horizontal line 20.3 cm. long, 
with 100 equal units indicated by vertical slashes. Under 
the horizontal line, the numbers 0-100 were printed in units 
of 10. Above the line, the question "How much control do you 
have over the score light?" was printed. The words "no con­
trol" were printed at the "0" end of the scale, and "complete 
control" appeared under the "100." 
The anagram task in the test phase consisted of the 20 five-
letter anagrams used in Seligman's work. The anagrams were 
each printed on a card, and all cards were contained in a 
binder. Each anagram had the same solution pattern, 5-3-1-2-4 
(e.g. , E R L K C) . 
Procedure 
All subjects participated individually. Each subject 
was greeted at the door and escorted to the table by the ex­
perimenter. For all except No-Pretreatment subjects, it was 
explained that the experiment consisted of two tasks, learning 
to press the button in such a way as to operate the score light, 
and solving a series of anagrams or "word puzzles." For the 
pretreatment task, it was explained that the Ready light meant 
that a trial was about to begin. During the Start light (one 
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trial) the subject was to press the button once. It was ex­
plained that, if the Score light flashed at the end of the 
trial, the subject had "hit" the target interval. The subject 
was to try to locate the target interval and then hit it on as 
many trials as possible. The subject was cautioned that the 
target interval was a small one. 
It was then explained that the Experimenter would oc­
casionally stop the apparatus and ask for a rating. The 
binder with rating sheets was handed to the subject and the 
rating procedure was explained: 
As you can see, you are asked to rate the degree of 
control that you feel you have developed over the 
score light at that time. A rating is made simply 
by drawing a slash through the line at whatever 
point you feel is appropriate. For example, a 
rating of 0 would mean that, at that point, you 
feel you have found no way to influence whether or 
not the score light will flash on any given trial. 
A rating of 10 0 means that you can make the score 
light flash on any trial by responding in a certain 
way, and that you also can respond in such a way as 
to ensure that the score light will not flash if you 
should choose to keep it from doing so. Ratings in 
between represent varying degrees of ability to con­
trol the score light. That is, you feel to some de­
gree that you could make the score light flash or not 
flash, but that you don't feel that you could com­
pletely control it. 
The subject was then allowed to watch the apparatus for 
3 trials without responding, to ensure that he understood the 
operation. The subject then made an initial rating, followed 
by a rating at the end of each 25 trials. The actual operation 
of the apparatus was as follows: The Ready light operated for 
3 sec., followed by the Start (trial) light, which stayed on 
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for 5 sec. The target interval was .63 sec. long, and was 
located 3.13 seconds into the trial. No stimulus changes 
corresponded to the target interval. Button presses during 
the target interval were recorded as "correct" responses 
for Contingent subjects only. 
For High Contingent subjects, each correct response was 
reinforced. For Low Contingent, 60% of the correct respoi oes 
were reinforced. For Noncontingent subjects, the experimenter 
secretly used a switch to operate the score light. The yoking 
procedure was accomplished by using the event record from each 
Contingent subject and giving that pattern of reinforcement 
to a yoked subject. The number of reinforcements for each 
Contingent subject was recorded, and a randomized schedule 
based on this number was given to a Random subject. For 
all noncontingent subjects, a scheduled reinforcement was 
delivered only if the subject responded on that trial. If 
no response occurred, the scheduled reinforcement was de­
livered on the next trial on which a response occurred. The 
pretreatment consisted of 75 trials with a mean intertrial 
interval of 9.6 sec. and a range of 6-12 sec. 
Upon completion of the pretreatment task, the subject's 
panel was removed and he was given the binder with the ana­
grams. The instructions, adapted from Hiroto and Seligman 
(1975), were as follows: 
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This task involves finding the solution to some 
anagrams. As you may know, anagrams are words with 
the letters scrambled. The problem is for you to 
unscramble the letters so that they form a word. 
As soon as you've found the word, tell me what it 
is, and then wait until I tell you to go on to the 
next one. Though these anagrams are not terribly 
easy, they do form words. One final point is that 
there may be a pattern or principle by which to solve 
the anagrams, but that's all I can say. 
The Experimenter then moved behind a screen and proceeded 
with the task. The subjects' response and latency were re­
corded. If the subject had failed to solve the anagram 
after 60 sec., a latency of 60 sec. was recorded and the 
subject was asked to go on to the next anagram. 
Subjects in the No-Pretreatment condition received only 
the instructions for the anagram task. They were not informed 
that there had been a previous task for other subjects. 
Dependent variables were the latency of response, number 
of failures to solve the anagrams, and trials to criterion 
defined as the number of trials required to reach 3 consecu­
tive responses in less than 15 seconds each. These are the 
dependent variables used by Hiroto and Seligman (1975). 
Upon completion of the anagram task, all subjects were 
then asked to complete two brief questionnaires, one for each 
task. The questions were designed to assist in determining 
whether any suspiciousness had emerged, and to see if any 
consistent factors could help in data interpretation. No 
special instructions were given for these questionnaires. 
All subjects were then given a thorough debriefing, and 
comments about the experiment were solicited. The debriefing 
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emphasized the potential importance of perception of control 
in understanding certain clinical problems. It was stressed 
that, on the pretreatment task/ we were interested in how 
certain patterns of events influenced perception of control. 
This explanation was given to focus attention on our testing 
of patterns in the environment, rather than on assessing the 
individual's ability to perceive control accurately. It was 
stressed that neither task reflected in any way on the sub­
jects' ability or intelligence. Subjects were then shown 
the operation of the control apparatus. A written version 
of the debriefing was mailed to all subjects at the end of 
the experiment. 
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RESULTS 
Independent Variables 
It will be recalled that the Contingent, Yoked, and Random 
conditions, summing across High and Low Rate of reinforcement, 
were conceptualized as forming a dimension of "similarity to 
controllability." In discussing the analysis to follow, this 
similarity factor will be referred to simply as "Groups," and 
the High-Low Rate factor will be referred to as Rate. Also, 
3 blocks of 25 trials and 4 ratings (1 prior to the task and 
3 during the task) were used, and this factor will be referred 
to as "Blocks." A fourth factor in the analysis was "Experi­
menter." Accordingly, a 2x3x2x3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
for repeated measures was performed on the obtained reinforce­
ments variable. Remember that, as Yoked and Random conditions 
were matched for reinforcement to the Contingent condition, no 
Groups difference in reinforcement was expected. The critical 
differences, then, were for Rate and Blocks (to insure the in­
creasing reinforcement pattern for Contingent and Yoked). A 
summary of the analysis is presented in Table 1. 
As planned, reinforcement did not differ among Groups. 
Obtained reinforcement increased for both Contingent and Yoked 
groups from block 1 to block 2 and from block 2 to block 3. 
For these groups, block 3 also had more reinforcement than block 
1. Reinforcement did not change across blocks in the Random 
condition. Contingent, Yoked and Random conditions did not 
TABLE 1 
Summary of ANOVA for Rate of Obtained 
Reinforcement over Blocks 
Source DF MEAN SQUARE F 
Rate (R) 1 1855.98 45.67 * 
Groups (G) 2 0.34 0 .01 
Experimenters (E) 1 47.02 1.16 
R x G 2 0. 51 0 .01 
R X E 1 80. 00 1.97 
G X E 2 0.04 0.00 
R X G x E 2 0 .32 0.01 
Error 48 40 . 64 
Blocks (B) 2 256.54 28.81 * 
R X B 2 62. 87 7.06 * 
G X B 4 67.70 7.60 * 
B x E 2 9. 77 1. 10 
B x R x G 4 16.06 1.80 
B x R x E 2 45. 35 5.09 * 
B x G x E 4 0.34 0.04 
B x R x G x E 4 6.77 0.76 
Error 96 8.90 
* p < .05 
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differ from each other at each block. These relationships were 
reflected in a Group x Block interaction (F = 7.60, df = 4, 
91, pc .05) and a Newman-Keuls post-hoc analysis. The means 
for this interaction are presented in Table 2. 
The Rate manipulation was successful, in that the High 
Rate condition received more reinforcement than Low Rate at 
each block. These results were consistent for both experi­
menters. A Newman-Keuls test revealed that, for High Rate 
(Experimenter 1), obtained reinforcement increased from block 
1 to block 2, though blocks 2 and 3 did not differ. No such 
increase occurred for the Low Rate condition with Experimenter 
1. For Experimenter 2, High Rate, there was an increase in 
reinforcement from blocks 1 and 2 to block 3, though blocks 
1 and 2 did not differ. As with Experimenter 1, the Low Rate 
conditions did not show increased reinforcement across blocks. 
These differences were reflected as a Rate x Block x Experimenter 
interaction (F = 5.09; df = 2, 96; p < .05). The means for Rate 
and Block are presented for each experimenter in Table 3. 
Analysis of Perceived Control Ratings 
The ratings taken prior to initiation of the pretreatment 
task did not differ for the High and Low Rate conditions. The 
effect of the differing rates of reinforcement once the task 
began, however, was that subjects receiving the High Rate of 
reinforcement perceived more control over the reinforcement than 
those receiving the Low Rate t (Figure 5) • This difference was 
TABLE 2 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Group X 
Block Interaction on Rate of Reinforcement 
Block 
1 2 3 
M 6.00 9. 40 12.15 
Contingent 
SD 3.91 6.09 6.64 
M 6.00 9 . 00 12. 35 
Group 
Yoked 
SD 3. 99 5.94 6.71 
M 9. 25 9. 40 9.15 
Random 
SD 4. 79 5.02 5. 34 
TABLE 3 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for 
Rate X Block X Experimenter Interaction 
on Rate of Reinforcement 
Experimenter Rate Block 
1 
High 
M 
1 2 3 
9. 47 13.67 13. 60 
I 
SD | 3.68 4. 32 4.37 
Low 
1 
M f 6.07 6.47 8. 93 
SD ! 3.63 5.19 5. 70 
2 
High 
M 8. 80 12.07 16.79 
I 
SD \ 5.61 4.79 4.90 
Low 
M ! 4.00 4.97 5 .53 
SD I 3.70 2.39 3.70 
MEAN 
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Figure 5. Rated Control as a Function 
of Trials 
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substantiated by a significant Newman-Keuls post hoc test on 
the ratings at blocks 2 and 3. Though the High and Low Rate 
mean ratings did not differ on the second rating (after the 
first block of trials), the High Rate mean was 18.23 points 
higher than the Low Rate mean, and this difference was barely 
less than the Newman-Keuls critical value for that contrast 
(18.26). On these ratings of perceived control, it did not 
matter whether reinforcement was Contingent, Yoked, or Random 
(the main effect for Group was nonsignificant). The dependency 
of perceived control upon rate of reinforcement is seen as a 
significant Rate x Block interaction on the ANOVA (F = 5.46; 
df = 3, 151; p< .05). Furthermore, at High Rate, all ratings 
taken during the pretreatment task were higher than the one 
taken prior to the-task. For Low Rate, however, the ratings 
did not change from the first rating through the last. Table 
4 presents the summary of the ANOVA on the ratings of perceived 
control. 
Anagram Task 
The different pretreatment conditions had no effect on 
anagram performance as reflected in latency of response and 
number of errors. On these measures, none of the pretreatment 
conditions differed from each other or from the No Pretreat­
ment control group. A correlational analysis of anagram per­
formance as a function of rated control likewise revealed no 
effects. A summary of the multivariate ANOVA performed on these 
measures is presented in Table 5. The means are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7. 
TABLE 4 
' Summary 'of ANOVA on Rated Degree of 
Control at each Block 
Source DF MEAN SQUARE ; F 
Rate (R) 1 27820.75 22.47 * 
Group (G) 2 466.01 0.38 
Experimenter (E] 1 3511.30 2. 84 
R x G 2 170.42 .14 
R x E 1 1382.39 1.12 
G x E 2 1185.43 . 96 
R x G x E 2 856.53 .69 
Error 48 1238.32 
Blocks (B) 3 10217 .64 22.40 * 
R x B 3 2488.58 5. 46 * 
B x G 6 637.49 1. 40 
B x E 3 376.40 0. 83 
R x B x G 6 261.59 0.57 
R x B x E 3 438.46 0.96 
B x G x E 6 529.34 1.16 
R x B x G x E 6 266 .34 0.58 
Error 144 456.06 
* p < .05 
TABLE 5 
Summary of MANOVA* for Latency and Number of 
Errors Measures of Anagram Performance 
Source DF F 
Rate (R) 2, 63 . 20 
Group (G) 2,124 1.03 
Experimenter (E) 2, 63 . 09 
R x G 6,124 .09 
R x E 2, 63 1. 19 
G x E 6,124 1.51 
R x G x E 11 6,124 . 81 
* Tested using Hotelling-Lawley Trace 
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TABLE 6 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Latency 
(in Sec.) Measure of Anagram Performance 
(Summed across Experimenters for Clarity 
of Presentation) 
Rate Group 
High M 
SD 
Contingent j Yoked Random Control 
27. 69 
15.00 
27. 93 
13. 79 
24.03 
13.66 
29.58 
13.27 
Low M 
SD 
j 
25.70 j 23.73 
1 
9.77 j 13.83 
23.21 
15.71 
31. 03 
7.97 
TABLE 7 
Means (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) for Errors 
Measure of Anagram Performance (Summed 
across Experimenters for Clarity 
of Presentation) 
Rate Grouo 
Contingent Yoked 
• 
Random Control 
High M 6.70 8.20 5.80 8.20 
SD 4.90 4.98 4.16 4.78 
Low M 6. 40 7.40 5.90 8. 60 
SD 3.17 5.87 5.30 4. 35 
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On the trials to criterion measure, however, subjects in 
the Contingent condition under Experimenter 2 took more trials 
to reach criterion than those under Experimenter 1. On this 
same measure, however, the means for each experimenter did not 
differ in the Yoked, Random, or No-Pretreatment groups. These 
differences emerged as a Group x Experimenter interaction on 
the ANOVA (F = 3.09; df = 1, 38; p C .05). The summary of 
this ANOVA is presented in Table 8. The means for each Ex­
perimenter at each Group are seen in Table 9. 
Postexperimental Questionnaire 
On the postexperimental questionnaire, employed to probe 
factors which could be helpful in interpretation, only two 
items were significant. One item asked subjects to weight the 
relative influence on their performance of ability, effort, 
task characteristics, and luck (Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, 
Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum, 1971). These ratings were done 
with the restriction that their total be 100%. Accordingly, 
an arcsin transformation was performed on the scores. On the 
pretreatment task, subjects in the High Rate condition tended 
to rate ability higher than those in the Low Rate condition. 
Also, on a 31-point scale, High Rate subjects indicated more 
interest than Low Rate subjects in participating in another 
experiment using the pretreatment task (F = 7.50; df = 1, 48; 
p < . 01) . 
TABLE 8 
Suiratiary of ANOVA on Trials to Criterion 
Measure of Anagram Performance 
Source DF MF AN SnTTA-PF F 
Rate (R) 1 5.91 .35 
Group (G) 3 42. 98 2.55 
Experimenter (E) 1 18.46 1.09 
R x G 3 10.30 .61 
R x E 1 9.29 .55 
G x E 3 52.14 3.09 * 
R x G x E 3 23.21 1.38 
Error 38 
I 
16: 87 
* p <. . 05 
TABLE 9 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Group 
X Experimenter Interaction on 
Trials to Criterion ANOVA 
Group Experimenter N 
Contingent 1 8 M 
SD 
8. 13 
2.53 
Contingent 2 6 M 
SD 
14. 83 
6. 49 
Yoked 1 4 M 
SD 
11. 50 
2. 89 
|Yoked 
t 
2 8 M 
SD 
10.13 
3 . 64 
f Random 
1 
1 8 M 
SD 
7 . 63 
4.03 
t 
r 
£ Random 
I 
2 6 M 
SD 
9.33 
3.56 
i 
f Control 
i 
1 7 M 
SD 
14. 43 
4. 79 
i 
I Control 
i 
2 7 M 
SD 
12 .14 
3. 48 
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Response Patterning"in Pretreatment and Perception of Control 
During each trial in the Pretreatment, an event recorder 
reflected the temporal location of each response. The recorder 
was programmed to divide each trial into .63 sec. intervals, 
and to reflect which interval contained the response. 
An an index of response patterning, the Standard Deviation 
(SD) of the response intervals was computed for each subject 
over each block of 25 trials. Hence, for subjects whose re­
sponding centered around a narrow band of time, this index 
would approach zero. Subjects who showed no consistent pat­
terning in responding would produce relatively greater indices. 
The above measure of response patterning during each 
block was then correlated with the rating of control given at 
the end of that block. For the combined Contingent groups, 
the correlation between response patterning and rating of 
control was -.64 (p < .01). The same correlation for all 
Noncontingent groups was -.30 (p < .01). Furthermore, there 
was a tendency for response variability to decrease as rein­
forcement increased. This tendency was reflected by a cor­
relation of -.74 (p < .01) for the Contingent conditions and 
-.33 (p < .01) for the Noncontingent conditions. 
62 
DISCUSSION 
Perception of Control Ratings 
If actual controllability of reinforcement on the pre-
treatment task were crucial in determining ratings of control, 
the ratings for the Contingent condition would be higher than 
those for Yoked and Random. Furthermore, it is likely that, 
using our instructions about the meaning of control, the High 
Contingent group would give higher ratings than the Low Con­
tingent group. That is, though both groups could produce or 
avoid the score light by varying their responses, the High 
Contingent group could produce it with more certainty than 
the Low Contingent group. The ratings for the Contingent, 
Yoked, and Random groups, however, did not differ. That is, 
actual controllability and patterning of reinforcement did 
not determine the ratings. In fact, only the Rate variable 
showed any consistent effect on ratings of control. As in 
the Jenkins and Ward (1965) study, ratings of control in­
creased with more reinforcement, regardless of the actual con­
tingency of reinforcement. That is, frequency of success, 
independently of contingency, influenced the ratings of control. 
This effect cannot be the result of chance bias in the ratings, 
as the two Rate conditions did not differ on the first rating 
(taken prior to initiation of the task). 
A theoretical point of view emphasizing contiguity, of 
course, would note that noncontingency is defined from the 
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experimenter's point of view, i.e., the experimenter adminis­
ters reinforcement without regard to the nature of the response 
emitted by the subject. From the subject's point of view, how­
ever, the case may be entirely different. A subject, especial­
ly one motivated to obtain reinforcement, may be expected to 
increase the frequency of a behavior which happens to precede 
reinforcement. Some of the subjects in the noncontingent 
condition did, in fact, show evidence of such "superstitious" 
learning. That is, the standard deviation of response intervals 
was quite small. 
Furthermore, there was a tendency for higher ratings of 
control to occur in subjects with less response variability, 
as reflected in the -.30 correlation between response variabili­
ty and perceived control in the noncontingent conditions. I 
am hesitant, however, to attribute to superstitious learning 
(in the traditional sense) the failure for noncontingent re­
inforcement to be perceived as noncontingent. One reason for 
such hesitancy is the fact that findings of superstitious 
learning have not fared well under recent theoretical and em­
pirical scrutiny (e.g. Staddon and Simmelhag, 1971). Perhaps 
a more compelling reason is that there was insufficient response 
stereotypy to suggest that superstitious learning had occurred. 
On the other hand, it is possible that superstitious learning, 
not in the sense of responding with a consistent latency, but 
in the sense of response distribution, did occur. For example, 
if response distribution tended to follow the reinforcement 
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distribution of early trials, this effect could be seen as a 
form of superstitious learning. Though response stereotypy 
would not be as evident in the latter case, such an effect 
would be evidence of control of responding by noncontingent 
reinforcement. In fact, it could be argued that the ratings 
of control in the noncontingent conditions reflect in them­
selves a kind of superstition. 
The question of response sampling and perceived control 
is an important one and deserves elaboration. In the present 
experiment, reduced response variability was correlated with 
more perceived control and with higher reinforcement rates for 
both contingent and noncontingent conditions. In the non-
contingent conditions, it would be possible for a contingency 
between responding and outcome to develop. Consider a hypo­
thetical case, for example, in which a subject made most of 
his responses in a narrow band of time, with very few responses 
occurring outside of this predominant band. A contingency 
could exist if the probability of reinforcement in the narrow, 
predominant band happened to differ from that for responses 
outside of this band. Such a difference could develop if 
response variability was very small, as in the case just 
described, owing to chance fluctuations in the prearranged 
schedule. That is, with a very small number of responses 
outside of the predominant band, there is less likelihood 
that the response-outcome probabilities for those few 
responses will approach the objective response-outcome 
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probabilities. The subject may not, in other words, have 
sampled enough to get a reliable estimate of the objective 
response-outcome contingency. As response variability in­
creases, there is more opportunity for the subject to find 
out that the reinforcement probability for all response 
bands is equal. 
Two points may be made in addressing the above problem. 
One is that, though the negative correlation between rate of 
reinforcement and response variability was statistically 
significant in the noncontingent conditions, this relationship 
leaves much variability unaccounted for. That is, the relation­
ship is not strong enough to suggest that response sampling 
was greatly reduced, even in the high rate condition. As the 
objective reinforcement probabilities for all response bands 
were equal in the noncontingent conditions, then, it is un­
likely that subjects were basing their judgements of control 
on the ability of variations in responding to produce varia­
tions in reinforcement probability. Secondly, Jenkins and 
Ward (1965) found that subjects receiving noncontingent rein­
forcement still judged moderate degrees of control even when 
the experiment was designed to produce equal sampling of all 
response-outcome probabilities. It appears, then, that the 
development of unexpected response-outcome contingency is not 
a likely explanation for the failure of noncontingent rein­
forcement to be perceived as such. Future experiments using 
noncontingent reinforcement, however, may do well to use 
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procedures in which the obtained degree of contingency may 
be readily evaluated. 
Of course, a possibility worth considering is that the 
method used to assess perception of contingency is not a 
particularly sensitive one. A different phrasing of the 
control question, different instructions, or some other 
procedural variation may have reflected more sensitivity on 
the part of subjects to the fact that the score light oc­
curred independently of their responding. Open-ended 
questioning at the conclusion of the experiment did indi­
cate that some subjects were able to state that the light 
came on after widely different responses, yet they gave non­
zero ratings of control. It is notable, however, that such 
comments also occurred for subjects who had received con­
tingent reinforcement. 
It must also be remembered that the instructions for 
the ratings included the idea that control meant being able to 
produce or avoid the score light by variations in responding. 
If subjects had been, as it were, correlating the variation 
in responding with variations in reinforcement, they would 
have reached the conclusion that their behavior had no con­
sistent effect on the probability of the score light. Hence, 
these ratings would have been lower than those for the con­
tingent conditions. With respect to the ratings of control in 
the pretreatment, then, we may conclude, as did Jenkins and 
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Ward (1965), that the subjects' concept of control was not 
based on statistical relatedness. This conclusion is also 
consistent with that of Smedslund (1963), who found that 
subjects' judgements of relatedness between events (symptoms 
and diseases) was based only on the frequency of conjunction 
of the events, and that the frequency of disjunction was 
not considered. The present experiment confirmed these find­
ings, and, further, suggested that degree of similarity to 
actual control did not affect the ratings. 
How, then, do these results relate to the empirical 
findings and theoretical statements of helplessness theory? 
With respect to the empirical results, it seems apparent that 
the practice of failing subjects on all discrimination prob­
lems essentially amounts to using zero reinforcement. Also, 
it will be remembered that the noise-escape studies used a 
feedback light which indicated whether the noise offset was 
a result of responding or whether the noise terminated on its 
own. Subjects in the noncontingent groups received the "failure" 
light on each trial. Again, this procedure places the sub­
ject in a situation represented by the origin or zero point of 
the instrumental training space. Postexperimental ratings in 
such studies have found that the noncontingent groups typical­
ly rate themselves as more helpless than the contingent groups. 
The results of the present experiment suggest that the dif­
ferences in perceived control could reflect differences in 
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reinforcement rate more than differences in controllability 
per se. 
The first portion of helplessness theory, as stated 
earlier, asserts that exposure to uncontrollability may result 
in perception of uncontrollability. Maier and Seligman (1976) 
also suggest that research is needed to explore the factors 
which determine when uncontrollability is perceived as such. 
The present results indicate quite clearly that rate of re­
inforcement is one of the variables which will influence the 
perception of control. Particularly interesting is the fact 
that rate of reinforcement is equally important in determin­
ing the perception of contingent and noncontingent reinforce­
ment. An interesting possibility is raised by the results of 
Benson and Kennelly (1976), who added an always-correct con­
dition to the triadic design used by Seligman. Benson and 
Kennelly found no interference on anagram performance follow­
ing 100% noncontingent reinforcement, though they did find 
interference after pretreatment comparable to that used by 
Seligman. Of particular relevance to the pretreatment in 
the present study, however, was the finding that the failure 
group and the always-correct group both perceived reinforce­
ment as uncontrollable. Of course, caution must be used in 
comparing results, owing to differences in tasks and in 
methods used to assess perception of control. The interest­
ing possibility is suggested, though, that perception of con­
trol may be an inverted-U function of amount of reinforcement, 
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with zero and 100% noncontingent reinforcement being perceived 
as uncontrollable, and intermediate amounts being erroneously 
perceived as somewhat controllable. 
The second portion of helplessness theory asserted that, 
once uncontrollability is perceived, it will interfere with 
subsequent performance. Again, it is mentioned that the 
limits of this transfer need to be explored. 
Clearly, the anagram phase of the present experiment was 
not consistent with the above assertion. The latency and 
number-of-errors measures did not reflect the effects of pre-
treatment. That is, though there were differences in rated 
control during the pretreatment, these differences were not 
reflected among the experimental groups or between the experi­
mental and No-Pretreatment conditions. The one difference 
which did emerge on the trials-to-criterion measure was be­
tween experimenters within the contingent group. This differ­
ence was unexpected and is difficult to interpret. Certainly, 
the finding cannot be predicted from any of the theoretical 
positions discussed in this paper. 
We now turn to possible reasons for the failure to find 
a transfer of the perception of control in pretreatment to 
performance on the anagram task. Certainly, the first possi­
bility which must be considered is that the hypothesis of 
transfer between pretreatment perceptions of controllability 
and test task performance is false, i.e., that the differ­
ences between perceived control reflected in the pretreatment 
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ratings of the High and Low Rate groups did not affect the 
anagram performance. If there were a strict relationship 
between initial perception of control and subsequent per­
formance, we should expect the lower perception of control in 
the Low Amount group to lead to interference in anagram per­
formance relative to the High Amount group. 
Recall that the most recent statement of helplessness 
theory by Maier and Seligman (19 76) stated that, once uncon-
trollability is perceived, it interferes with subsequent 
performance. Whether the present results can fairly be applied 
to the stated helplessness theory, then, depends on what is 
meant by perceived uncontrollability. The final mean rating 
of control for subjects in the High Rate group was 62.90, 
which can be seen as reflecting a moderate degree of control. 
The Low Rate ratings were considerably lower (30.67). As 
the probing procedures used for measuring perceived control 
were very different than those used in other helplessness 
experiments, we cannot be sure whether this latter perception, 
admittedly at the lower end of the scale, is low enough to be 
expected to interfere with subsequent performance. 
Of course, caution must be used in making interpretations 
of such negative findings. A clear possibility is that some­
thing inherent in the task or procedures could have mitigated 
the effects of pretraining perceptions and caused the failure 
of these perceptions to transfer. For example, Klein, 
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Fenci]-Morse^and Seligman (1976) found that a group receiving 
instructions to attribute failure to the difficulty of the 
task did not show the interference effect after uncontrollable 
failure. This attributional effect appeared only for de­
pressed subjects, however, and did not occur for nondepressed 
subjects. The present study did not explicitly vary de­
pression, so extrapolation from the Klein et al., results is 
difficult. It appears, however, that the subject's attri­
butions for his performance in pretreatment could be an im­
portant variable in determining whether transfer will occur. 
Another procedural difference deserving attention is 
that ratings of control were taken during the pretreatment. 
If the act of making ratings during the pretreatment sensi­
tized the subjects to the dimension of controllability, they 
may have been more alert to the solvability of the anagrams 
and thus removed any differences among pretreatment groups 
or between pretreatment and no-pretreatment control groups. 
Finally, social interaction variables between the ex­
perimenters and subjects cannot be ruled out. Such variables 
are difficult to quantify and include in describing procedures. 
The fact remains, however, that the present experimenters 
interacted with subjects in a relatively neutral manner, i.e., 
periodically asking the subject to make a rating. The inter­
actions in Seligman1s experiments with insoluble discrimination 
problems involved repeatedly telling the subjects that they 
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were not correct in their estimate of the correct value. Such 
differences in experimenter behavior could conceivably affect 
the stressfulness of the task and, hence, performance on the 
task. 
In fairness, then, the above criticisms suggest caution 
in interpreting the failure to find interference here as con­
trary to helplessness theory. The reasons for caution es­
sentially involve the fact that the present experiment did not 
demonstrate the ability to produce any kind of transfer from 
pretreatment to test task. If, for example, a group had been 
used which received complete failure on the pretreatment (with 
very low control ratings) and this group had shown transfer, 
we could be more certain that the absence of transfer in the 
other groups reflected the effects of the reinforcement levels 
used. Failure to find transfer in such a group would strength­
en interpretations based on sensitization, task characteristics, 
and so forth. 
With these cautions in mind, then, what can be said about 
the relevance of these results for helplessness theory? Maier 
and Seligman (1976) have stated that perception of noncon-
tingency can result from exposure to noncontingent reinforcement. 
They further suggest that clarification is needed with re­
spect to variables which determine whether or not noncontin-
gency will be perceived. The finding that perceived control 
increases with increased reinforcement, regardless of actual 
73 
contingency, suggests an important boundary condition for 
the first part of helplessness theory. It is suggested that 
subjects are more likely to develop the belief that rein-
forcers are uncontrollable when those reinforcers are infre­
quent. Apparently, uncontrollability per se is not sufficient 
for the development of a perception of uncontrollability. 
The finding of Benson and Kennelly (1976) that 100% noncon-
tingent reinforcement did not produce interference of sub­
sequent performance, even though comparisons with the failure 
group revealed that both perceived reinforcement as uncon­
trollable, is apparently at odds with the present results. 
We cannot say whether or not a group receiving the score 
light on every trial would give ratings lower than those 
receiving an intermediate amount, but an empirical test of 
such a proposition should be enlightening. With respect to 
the failure to find transfer, a tentative conclusion is that 
intermediate reinforcement amounts do not produce sufficient 
perception of uncontrollability to cause interference on the 
test task. 
In developing the position in the present paper that rate 
of reinforcement must be equal for an unbiased evaluation of 
the effects of contingent and noncontingent reinforcement, I 
have chosen to work within the limitations of the yoked control 
procedure. Church (1964) has argued cogently, however, that 
individual subject differences in sensitivity to reinforcement 
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do not effect experimental and yoked groups equally, and that 
the bias is in favor of superior responding in the experi­
mental group. Such differences, he suggests, can complicate 
interpretation of results in which a yoked control has been 
employed. Further work in helplessness theory might well 
explore alternatives to the yoked control procedure, such as 
single subject designs. Another possibility, especially in 
exploring the reinforcement patterning dimensions, would be 
to employ experimenter-determined noncontingent reinforcement 
schedules rather than relying on patterns generated by subjects 
in the contingent conditions. Even in the absence of Church's 
arguments, the former procedure has the advantage of reducing 
the variability generated by subjects in the contingent groups, 
and, consequently, rendering more detectable the differences 
among experimental conditions. 
The present work has perhaps suggested more questions 
than answers. Though extensions of helplessness theory to 
clinical areas such as anxiety and depression are interesting, 
it is clear that more understanding of the laboratory phe­
nomenon of helplessness is needed before such extensions can 
be fully evaluated. Parametric work along the lines of the 
experiment reported here is needed. For example, the extremes 
of the uncontrollability diagonal (noncontingent failure and 
noncontingent success) need to be explored in conjunction with 
the intermediate range. If transfer is found under some 
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conditions, systematic variation of such variables as experi­
menter "warmth," attributions for failure, and similarity of 
pretreatment and test situations need to be explored to 
assess the robustness of the transfer effect. Another pos­
sible potent variable would be expectation for performance 
level during the pretreatment phase. Manipulation of this 
expectation should alter the effectiveness of obtained re­
inforcement. That is, the effectiveness of a particular rate 
of reinforcement would depend on the expected rate of rein­
forcement for the task. 
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